توضیحات
Electric power utilities have long been leaders in the critical infrastructure community for contingency planning. Utilities are required at a minimum to demonstrate N-1 contingency planning such that they are able to serve peak demands during a sudden outage of any, single crucial elements, among other specified multiple contingencies . Reliability metrics such as SAIDI, SAIFI, CAIDI, CAIFI, and others have been widely accepted as a means for measuring reliability and for demonstrating that grid operators are sufficiently prepared for disruptions and have appropriately responded to and managed power outages that occur under relatively normal conditions.
Because of the changing hazard landscape, the critical infrastructure and power grid communities have recognized that reliability metrics are not sufficient by themselves to effectively plan for many of the emerging hazards. Reliability metrics measure grid operations during expected outages that could occur under relatively normal conditions. However, reliability metrics typically do not include outage information when low-probability, high-consequence events such as storms, earthquakes, and cyber-attacks occur. [1]
Building a strategy to increase system resilience requires an understanding of a wide range of preparatory, preventative, and remedial actions, as well as how these impact planning, operation, and restoration over the entire life cycle of different kinds of grid failures. Strategies must be crafted with awareness and understanding of the temporal arc of a major outage, as well as how the needs differ from one type of event to another. It is also important to differentiate between actions designed to make the grid more robust and resilient to failure (e.g., wind-resistant steel or concrete poles rather than wood poles) and those that improve the effectiveness of recovery (e.g., preemptively powering down some pieces of the system to minimize damage). Some actions serve both strategies, some serve one but not the other, and some serve one while inhibiting the other. Similarly, the timing of repairs is different depending on the cause. For example, repairs can begin immediately after a tornado has passed, but flooding following a hurricane can delay the start of repair and impede repair efforts. Good planning and preparation are essential to mitigating, coping with, and recovering from major outages. Both human and technical systems must be designed before grid failure so the responders can assess the extent of failure and damage, dispatch resources effectively, and draw on established component inventories, supply chains, crews, and communication channels [7].
Grid resilience is a concept related to a power system’s ability to continue operating and delivering power even in the event that low probability, high-consequence disruptions such as hurricanes, earthquakes, and cyber-attacks occur. Grid resilience objectives focus on managing and, ideally, minimizing potential consequences that occur as a result of these disruptions. Currently, no formal grid resilience definitions, metrics, or analysis methods have been universally accepted. This document describes an effort to develop and describe grid resilience metrics and analysis methods. The metrics and methods described herein extend upon the Resilience Analysis Process (RAP) developed by Watson et al. for the 2015 Quadrennial Energy Review. The extension allows for both outputs from system models and for historical data to serve as the basis for creating grid resilience metrics and informing grid resilience planning and response decision-making. [ ]. Causes of Most Electricity System Outages (shown in alphabetical order) [7]:
• Cyber attacks
• Drought and water shortage
• Earthquakes
• Floods and storm surge
• Hurricanes
• Ice storms
• Major operations errors
• Physical attacks
• Regional storms and tornadoes
• Space weather and other
• electromagnetic threats
• Tsunamis
• Volcanic events
• Wildfires
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